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Introduction 
The 2011 Libyan civil war, part of the wider Arab Spring, triggered considerable population 
displacements. These displacements included both Libyans and third-country nationals fleeing the 
country by land, air and sea. Data available for spring/summer 2011 shows that an estimated 
1,128,985 people left Libya to seek shelter in Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan as well 
as in Malta and Italy. Research has, thus far, mainly focused on the response of the international 
community (UNHCR and IOM, above all), the European Union and individual countries in dealing 
with large numbers of displaced persons (Kelly and Wadud 2012, Fargues and Fandrich 2012, Tucci 
2012, Forced Migration Review 2012). Less attention has been given to those regional entities of 
which Libya has been a member. These include: the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States 
(LAS), the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Organization for the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). The aim of this paper is, therefore, to shed light on the (actual and potential) role of 
these regional organizations in alleviating those fleeing from Libya.  
The paper will be divided into five sections: First, it will outline the different movements and 
categories of refugees/migrants affected by the conflict. Second, it will briefly discuss the protection 
gaps of the international refugee regime (in particular the 1951 Convention) that became visible during 
the crisis. In the third part, different regional frameworks will be analyzed in order to find out whether: 
a) there are any regional migration or refugee instruments in place; and b) whether concrete action has 
been taken at the regional level. To complete the picture, the fourth section will look, instead, at those 
countries surrounding Libya and describe their reaction to the recent mass displacements by looking 
into their relations with Libya prior to the crisis. The last section will summarize the findings and 
frame key questions for future research. 
The paper is mainly based on desk research including an analysis of legal texts (treaties, free 
movement or migration protocols, refugee conventions etc), policy documents, annual reports and 
strategy papers. Working papers, policy briefs, research reports, blogs and online media were also 
used as secondary sources. 
The Libya crisis in context: Movements and categories of refugees/migrants 
The Libya crisis, beginning in February 2011, culminated in the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, a 
regime which had ruled the country for 42 years. After a series of public demonstrations erupted 
against Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli, protests quickly spread across the country, reaching the city of 
Benghazi, which became the opposition´s stronghold and base for the National Transitional Council. 
The responses of the international community followed in March 2011 with a NATO intervention and 
a no fly zone (NFZ). It took, though, another five months before Gaddafi was ousted and Tripoli was 
captured by the opposition. 
Since the beginning of the uprisings, the Libya crisis has forced thousands of people to flee the 
country by land, air or sea to seek for safer haven. According to IOM data, by 7 October 2011 around 
721,772 non-Libyan nationals had fled the country (IOM, 2011b). A breakdown in table 1 shows that 
229.514 of these crossed the border to Egypt, 313,414 to Tunisia, 82,935 to Niger, 13,962 to Algeria, 
51,682 to Chad, and 2,800 to Sudan. The estimated number of those fleeing from Libya to Malta and 
Italy stood at about 27,465.  
Libyan nationals also crossed the borders in large numbers, but according to IOM information they 
were, for the most part, short-term circular migrants, inter alia, buying goods or bringing their family 
to safe places. By the end of August 2011, only 4,500 of the 247,167 Libyans who had crossed the 
Egyptian border were reported to have stayed in the country for a longer period of time (IOM, 2012). 
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Of the 626,010 Libyans who had gone to Tunisia the great majority has apparently returned to Libya 
(Ibid.). Yet, one should not forget that a considerable number of Libyan nationals (UNHCR estimates 
are of 200,000 persons) were internally displaced within the country. 
Only around one percent of those leaving Libya actually came to Europe. This is in sharp contrast 
to the feared “biblical exodus” and claims that 1.5 million migrants would invade Europe from Libya 
(de Haas, 2011). According to the IOM, 16 May, 10,946 arrivals from Libya were counted in Italy and 
1,106 for Malta (IOM, 2011a). Other reported figures of people arriving on the southern shores of 
Europe are often higher, because North African migrants are counted in general and not only those 
arriving from Libya. Taking into account arrivals from Tunisia, the total number of new arrivals in 
Italy between mid-January and mid-May 2011 amounted to 34,460 people, among them 23,230 
Tunisians and 11,230 other nationalities including Nigerians, Eritreans, Ivoirians, Somalis and 
Ghanaians (IOM, 2011a). However, only a small proportion of all the people crossing the 
Mediterranean in search of greener pastures have been refugees (Guterres, 2011). 
The most immediate impact of this human displacement has been on neighbouring countries, 
primarily Egypt and Tunisia, which clearly bore the brunt of the refugee crisis as illustrated by the 
numbers above. Tunisia, for instance, opened its borders to all new arrivals, while Egypt only 
introduced visa-requirements for Libyans at a later point (7 May 2011), while allowing refugees and 
asylum-registered Libyan or third-country nationals to enter the country without any restriction. The 
most pressing issues were people’s basic needs (e.g. accommodation, food, clothing, and medical 
services) and durable solutions with regard to resettlement and repatriation. This has been particularly 
challenging since people leaving Libya had such very different profiles, including among others: (1) 
Third-country Nationals (TCNs), who resided in Libya, wishing to return to their countries of origin; 
(2) Libyan nationals fleeing persecution and violence; (3) Refugees or asylum seekers from third 
countries who have resided in and/or transited through Libya; (4) Individuals ineligible for 
international refugee protection; and (5) Individuals with specific needs e.g. women at risk, 
unaccompanied/separated children or trafficked persons (UNHCR, 2011). In addition, the situation in 
Libya has been particularly dangerous for Sub-Saharan migrant workers facing the risk of violent 
attacks because they were suspected of being mercenaries in Gaddafi’s pay.1 While the existence of 
“black African mercenaries” remains subject to speculation, several violent outbursts against migrant 
workers from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia or Sudan have been reported.2
It is also worth noting that the number of sub-Saharan migrants leaving Libya has been much 
smaller than the number of North African or South Asian migrants. This suggests that these migrants 
may be involuntarily stuck in the country and that it may be difficult to help them (Bonfiglio, 2011). 
Apparently this was the case with the Palestinians and the Sahrawians, who were not allowed to enter 
Egypt, Tunisia or former host countries because of a lack of recognized travel documents.  
 
International responses and protection gaps 
Those international organizations mainly responsible for providing support to the countries affected by 
the recent displacements (including Libya) were UNHCR and, to a lesser extent, the IOM.3
                                                     
1 Al Jazeera, 28 February 2011, at 
 UNHCR is 
mandated to lead and coordinate international action for the protection of refugees and to supervise the 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/02/201122865814378541.html.  
2 See Hein de Haas´ blog from 21 February 2011 at http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2011/02/gaddafi-regime-fuels-racist-
violence-in.html.  
3 The IOM has mainly been involved with evacuating third-country nationals from Libya and neighbouring countries (mainly 
Egypt, Tunisia and Niger). In joint cooperation, the IOM and UNHCR have also launched a so-called Humanitarian 
Evacuation Cell (HEC) to help decongest the Tunisian border with Libya. More information on IOM´s involvement in 
Libya can be found at: http://www.migration-crisis.com/libya/main. 
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application of the 1951 Refugees Convention and its 1967 Protocol.4 The 1951 Refugees Convention 
spells out who is considered a refugee and defines refugees’ rights and obligations, as well as 
categories of people who do not qualify for refugee status. The most important provisions include the 
right to flee persecution, to seek and enjoy asylum and the principle of non-refoulement, i.e. countries 
are prohibited from returning refugees or asylum seekers to territories where their lives or freedoms 
are still threatened. 5
At the time of writing, the Convention has 145 state parties around the world, including all 27 EU 
Member States, as well as those states surrounding Libya, excluding, however, Libya itself.
  
6
One of the major challenges is that most of those fleeing the conflict in Libya are technically not 
covered by the 1951 Refugees Convention. Libyan nationals might face difficulties in proving that 
they are at risk because of one of the five reasons (race, religion, nationality, membership in social 
group or political opinion) stated in the Refugees Convention. Furthermore, migrant workers from 
third countries are unable to claim protection under this instrument because the Refugees Convention 
is confined to “persons with a well-funded fear of persecution only in relation to their country of 
nationality” (Wood, 2012: 8, emphasis added). 
 Since the 
1951 Refugees Convention contains a rather narrow definition of a refugee, UNHCR itself refers 
primarily to the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention as a legal basis for granting international protection 
to people fleeing Libya (UNHCR, 2011:2). However, UNHCR notes that a number of Libyan 
nationals may also fall under the 1951 Refugees Convention or other forms of subsidiary protection. 
The only international convention specifically targeting migrant workers, the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
has two main pitfalls: first, it has not been ratified by any major destination country;7
In addition to the specific conventions described above, broader international human rights law also 
provides protection from being returned to a situation where one´s life would be a risk. But even 
though the principle of non-refoulement is recognized as customary (international) law, it is violated in 
all countries including in European Union Member States (Tucci, 2012). 
 second, and 
equally important, it provides rights for migrant workers only in the country of residence and does not 
address the issue of displacement (Wood, 2012: 9).  
We will, therefore, now turn to the regional level and try to assess whether regional or sub-regional 
instruments offer an alternative source of protection. 
Regional responses  
European Union 
The EU’s response to Libyan refugees (or absence thereof) needs to be seen in a broader context of 
increased migration flows triggered by the “Arab Spring” in North Africa, in particular from Tunisia 
to Italy and Malta. The initial arrival of around 6,000 “boat people” from Tunisia on the Italian island 
                                                     
4 Since the 1951 Refugees Convention was originally confined to Europe as a result of WWII, it was broadened by the 1967 
Protocol making it universal in scope. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees is an independent legal 
document, though closely related to the 1951 Convention. The Protocol basically lifts the time and geographical limits of 
the 1951 Convention. For more information see UNHCR, Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law. 
5 Other rights include, among other things, access to national courts, free movement, right to seek employment and access to 
education, as well as social, economic and civil rights comparable to those of nationals in host countries. 
6 For a detailed list of current states parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol see 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html  
7 For a comprehensive analysis see Cholewinski, de Guchteneire and Pecoud (2009). 
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of Lampedusa in February 2011 generated two major EU reactions: First, a joint Frontex Operation 
called Hermes was launched 20 February to strengthen sea patrols and prevent illegal landings on the 
coast. Second, the possibility of financial assistance through the European Border Fund (EBF) was 
discussed at the EU level.  
Given that migrants from Tunisia and other African countries continued to arrive, Italy decided 
unilaterally to issue temporary residence permits to Tunisian migrants, which according to the Italian 
authorities would allow them to travel freely in the Schengen area (Pascouau, 2011). As a 
consequence, in April 2011, France reintroduced internal border controls to prevent the entry of North 
African migrants arriving from Italy.8
With regard to those fleeing from Libya, the situation was slightly different because Libyans and 
third-country nationals arriving from Libya were considered (at least potential) refugees seeking 
international protection; while most of the migrants coming from Tunisia were regarded as “economic 
migrants”, who could be send back to their countries. In this situation, both Italy and Malta tried to 
invoke the EU Directive on Temporary Protection (2001), which aims to harmonize temporary 
protection for displaced persons in cases of mass influx on the basis of solidarity between member 
states.
 This “Italian-French affair” caused a diplomatic row between 
the two countries and triggered discussions on the modification of the Schengen rules both at the EU 
and national level.  
9 Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, criticized the EU heavily for not assisting Italy, save 
with financial aid, and stated that in addition to funds it was necessary to: “invoke a European law 
clearly establishing the adoption of an extraordinary plan with any sudden influx of refugees toward 
one or more Member States, which includes the distribution of the refugees among Members within 
the temporary timeframe necessary to repatriate those who are not refugees, as in the case of the 
Tunisians, who are simply economic immigrants”.10 Maltese MEP Simon Busuttil argued along 
similar lines. He called upon the Commission “to activate the Solidarity Mechanism envisaged in EU 
law in cases of mass influx of displaced persons”(Ibid). The request was, however, turned down by 
member states and the European Commission on grounds that the situation did not really meet the 
criteria as laid down in the directive.11
Instead, the European Commission offered financial and logistical assistance to evacuate and to 
repatriate third-country nationals to Libya and neighbouring countries, supporting the work of UNHCR 
and the IOM.
 
12 In addition, it allocated around 25 million Euros for 2011 under the External Borders 
Fund (EBF) and the European Refugee Fund (ERF).13
                                                     
8 For a detailed discussion of the legality and compatibility of the Italian and French measures with EU legislation see Sergio 
Carrera et al. (2011), A Race against Solidarity. The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security, April 2011. 
 Another potential field of common action would 
9 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a 
mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.  
10 Frattini criticized EU for failure to assist Italy; Frattini and MEPs call for Implementation of Temporary Protection 
Directive and Mandatory Burden Sharing, Migrants at sea-blog at http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/ 30 
March 2011. 
11 According to a Commission official, the inflows of refugees to both Malta and Italy were not considered a “massive 
influx” since the numbers of potential refugees were relatively small. See also article by Timothy J Hatton, who indicates 
that the “request was turned down by other countries and the European Commission as premature”, see “Refugees from 
North Africa: A case for cooperation?”, VoxEU.org, 2 May 2011. 
12 According to a Commission Communication it has allocated 40 million Euro to evacuate and repatriate third-country 
nationals and provide assistance to those in need in Libya and neighbouring countries. See COM (2011) 292/3 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries.  
13 These additional funds are available on the basis of concrete requests by Member States. See COM(2011) 292/3.  
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have been coordinated relocation and resettlement of refugees. EU Member States did support Malta in 
offering several hundred relocation places (Garlick and Van Selm, 2012: 21). The willingness to resettle 
refugees from North Africa was, however, much weaker since only 600 persons were collectively 
accepted by EU Member States as compared to 500 by Norway and 700 by the US (Ibid.).  
The relatively weak response of the EU to migration from Libya and the refugee crisis should, 
however, not conceal that there are mechanisms in place to deal with such cases. First, since informal 
cooperation on questions of asylum started in the 1980s, the EU has developed a range of legal 
instruments in this field with the ultimate goal of creating a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS).14 The most visible instrument is the Dublin II regulation (a second version of the 1990 
Dublin Convention). This instrument determines which member state is responsible for examining an 
asylum application based on a hierarchical list of criteria.15 The major goal behind this regulation is 
twofold: (1) ensuring access of asylum seekers to one single procedure (“one Member State, one 
procedure”); and (2) preventing “asylum shopping” i.e. multiple claims are detected through the 
EURODAC system and consequently examined only once. Despite general appraisal by the European 
Commission, the Dublin Regulation does, however, display certain weaknesses. These include the so-
called “asylum lottery” (recognition rates in EU Member States vary considerably) or the 
implementation deficits, which arise once agreement is reached on which country is responsible.16
EU Member States have, furthermore, to guarantee minimum standards as laid down in four major 
legal instruments: the Reception Directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC)
  
17; the Procedures Directive 
(Council Directive 2005/85/EC)18; the Qualifications Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC)19; and 
the Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC)20
Second, the above mentioned Temporary Protection Directive is a potential instrument to deal with 
a sudden and massive influx of refugees. This directive was developed in the context of human 
displacements caused by the former Yugoslavia wars between 1991 and 1995, but it has never been 
. No in-depth analysis of these legal instruments can be 
given here. However, it is important to note that the countries which have to examine asylum claims 
lodged by refugees coming from Libya (Libyans or third-country nationals fleeing from Libya) are 
bound to comply with the requirements laid down in different sources of EU asylum law. Whether 
Italy or Malta, which were the major receiving countries in this regard, are complying with these rules, 
needs to be carefully examined elsewhere. 
                                                     
14 For more information on the establishment of the CEAS see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/asylum/asylum_intro_en.htm.  
15Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national.  
16 According to Francesco Maiani, 12 per cent of all applications gave rise to transfer request, only 50 per cent of these are, 
however, implemented, i.e. agreement is reached on the country to examine the asylum claim, but transfer of the asylum 
seekers is not carried out in the end. Anecdotal evidence shows that asylum seekers try to avoid the transfer, which might 
be an indication that the Dublin Regulation does work with regard to avoiding multiple claims, but not with applying 
respective criteria. Presentation of Prof. Francesco Maiani during Odysseus Summer School on EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law, Brussels 13 July 2011. 
17 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 deals mainly with issues of information, documentation, freedom of 
movement, healthcare, accommodation, schooling of minors, access to the labour market and to vocational training. For a 
critical view on the Council Directive 2003/9/EC see: UNHCR, ECRE, Odysseus Network. 
18Council Directive (2005/85/EC) of 1 December 2005, on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status.  
19 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted. 
20 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals.  
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used. As mentioned earlier, the Temporary Protection Directive was not invoked in the case of Libya 
as it was not considered to be a massive influx of refugees. 
Finally, one possible form of coordinated action would come through the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO). In the case of Libya this was, however, not (yet) an option, because EASO 
only became fully operational 19 June 2011. It remains to be seen to what extent this new European 
agency will work in such situations since it explicitly refers to “support Member States subject to 
particular pressure on the asylum and reception system”.21
Regional Responses in North Africa 
  
While the African Union (AU) was clearly involved in the political solution of the Libyan crisis 
(Abass et al. 2011), information on joint-action towards the Libyan displacements is limited. It is, 
however, important to bear in mind that the AU is mandated to become active in this field and that 
most of its members have acceded to its regional refugee convention. In order to complement the 
geographical and temporal limits of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the then Organization of African 
Unity (OAU)22 adopted, in 1969, a regional Convention targeting the specific problems of refugees in 
Africa.23
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence 
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality. (OAU 
Convention 1969, Art. 1(2)). 
 The OAU Convention emerged in the context of African decolonization and independence 
movements, which were followed by massive displacement of people. It was jointly drafted with 
UNHCR and the purpose was to complement the 1951 Geneva Convention by providing regional 
solutions to the problem (Kneebone and Rawlings-Sanaei, 2007:6). With regard to the term “refugee”, 
the OAU Convention follows the general definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Art.1(1)) but 
broadens the scope by including an additional paragraph:  
This broadening in scope illustrates the circumstances in which the Convention was adopted, 
namely liberation from colonial rule and the massive migrant flows arising hereof. Today 45 Member 
States of the African Union have ratified or acceded to the OAU Convention Six Member States have 
signed but have not yet ratified (Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe and 
Somalia), and 2 Member States have neither signed, ratified or acceded to the Convention (Eritrea and 
S.A.D.R.).24
The OAU Convention displays two major differences as compared to its 1951 counterpart: first, all 
countries in the North African region including Libya are signatories to the OAU Refugees 
Convention. Second, its refugee definition is broader and can consequently encompass human 
displacements caused by general violence and conflict. Nonetheless, it also displays certain 
weaknesses. According to Wood (2012) refugees recognized under the OAU Convention may be 
denied access to durable solutions, such as resettlement, since this is only available to refugees under 
 
                                                     
21 Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 May 2010 establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office, Sect. 2 Art. 8. 
22 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the predecessor of the African Union (AU). It was established on 25 May 
1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and replaced by the AU in 2002. The text of the OAU Charter is available at: 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm. 
23 The 1951 Geneva Convention was basically complemented by two major regional Conventions: the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 (“OAU Refugees Convention”) and the 
Cartagena Convention (1984) which covers Central America, Mexico and Panama. 
24 See detailed list on AU website (as of 10 December 2012) http://www.au.int/en/treaties 
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the 1951 Convention. Second, it is not entirely clear how third-country nationals should be treated 
under this legal instrument.  
As a regional organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was among the first 
to respond to the needs of displaced people from Libya. It produced, in fact, regular situation reports 
long before the international humanitarian community started to do so (Shaw-Hamilton, 2012). It 
launched different appeals to its member states to assist with the evacuation of displaced people 
fleeing from Libya into neighboring countries. On 1 March 2011, the Secretary General of the OIC, 
Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanogu, called upon member states to assist the Tunisian government by providing 
transport means to return displaced people to their countries of origin25 The OIC also organized a fact-
finding mission to assess the humanitarian conditions in affected border areas with Egypt and Tunisia: 
this proved the basis for further appeals and action. In addition, the OIC coordinated concrete 
evacuation operations and has been involved in the distribution of relief items to people in refugee 
camps at the Tunisian Libyan border.26
In contrast, CEN-SAD, AMU and COMESA have apparently not reacted in a coordinated fashion 
to refugee flows from Libya. Within the CEN SAD the principle of free movement remains largely a 
“paper” objective and travel between the Member States is regulated primarily by bilateral agreements 
(Brachet, 2010). There is no indication of a common position or action in the case of refugees coming 
from Libya, which might be not surprising given the fact that Gaddafi himself had been the driving 
force behind this regional organization. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) also remains a rather 
dormant organization, especially concerning the movement of people, which is regulated primarily 
through bilateral accords. COMESA has adopted concrete instruments on intra-regional migration, 
though they remain largely unimplemented. No regional instruments exist so far targeting refugees in 
particular and there have also been no signs of common action.  
 
Responses of neighbouring countries 
In order to complement the picture, we will now turn to the individual responses of those countries 
neighbouring Libya. While the reactions of Tunisia and Egypt have been well documented (IOM 
2011a, 2011b, 2012), less attention has been given to Libya’s remaining neighbours. It is important to 
note that while Libya itself was temporarily following a pro-regional approach, it later gave priority to 
bilateral agreements and a case-to-case policy (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2011:8). 
Chad 
An estimated 51,000 Chadians and 800 third-country nationals crossed the border to Chad during the 
crisis (see table 1). According to the IOM (2012:15), the first people fleeing across Libya´s southern 
border were registered at the end of March 2011.  
Chad has a unique country profile as it bridges sub-Saharan and North Africa and east and west 
Sahel. Relations between Chad’s president Idriss Déby and Muammar Gaddafi’s were strong and 
personal. This is evident in the substantial Libyan military support, economic investment and political 
brokering of peace deals between Déby and various rebel movements in Chad, as well as between 
Chad and Sudan.27
                                                     
25 OIC news item of 3 March 2011 at 
 While at the start of the insurgency president Déby offered his political backing to 
Gaddafi, only belatedly has he aligned with Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC). The NTC 
http://www.oic-oci.org/home.asp  
26 See news items of 4April 2011 “OIC begins repatriating displaced people on Libyan borders to their countries” at 
http://www.oic-oci.org/home.asp 
27 Ketil Fred Hansen, “Chad’s relations with Libya, Sudan, France and the US”, 15 April 2011, Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre. 
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claimed that Chadian fighters supported Gaddafi militarily and encouraged racist attacks against black 
Africans and refugees, accusations, which were vehemently rejected by Chad. The fact is that Chadian 
nationals in Libya have been frequently perceived and treated as mercenaries, though the 
overwhelming majority has been residing there for years for purely economic reasons. 
Niger 
There was close and strong cooperation between Niger and Gaddafi’s Libya. Gaddafi channelled tens 
of millions of dollars in investment and aid toward Niger, building roads, mosques, including the 
capital’s main mosque, as well as the new seat of Niger’s national assembly. Gaddafi also allowed 
more than 100,000 Nigeriens to work in Libya and their remittances were vital for Niger’s economy. 
After the fall of Gaddafi, Niger represented a favoured refuge for his loyalists. In September 2011 the 
Nigerian government officially acknowledged receiving 32 Gaddafi loyalists, including relatives and 
military generals, not least Saadi Gaddafi, son of the former Libyan leader, who has been granted 
asylum on humanitarian grounds. The Nigerian government still, today, refuses Saadi Gaddafi’s 
bilateral extradition to Libya, claiming that he would not receive a fair trial.28
Sudan 
  
Official figures indicate that 2,800 migrants crossed the border between Libya and Sudan. More than 
1,800 Sudanese were directly repatriated by airplanes, coming principally from Tunisia and a smaller 
group crossed from Chad to reach their homes (IOM, 2012:15). 
Relations between Gaddafi and successive regimes in Khartoum have been marked by political 
tension. While in early years Gaddafi was a close friend of the then Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeiri, 
he later became an enemy and tried to assassinate Nimeiri more than once. The current Sudanese 
president, Omer al-Bashir continued the hostility of his predecessor. He recently acknowledged that 
Sudanese weapons were smuggled through Egypt and reached Gaddafi’s opponents west of the Libyan 
capital Tripoli.29
Many Sudanese nationals started to go to Libya in search of work as long as a decade ago. 
However, they were always vulnerable to the political climate of bilateral/regional relations. In 
September 1995, for example, in retaliation for the Palestine Liberation Organization making peace 
with Israel, Gaddafi’s government ordered more than 200,000 Sudanese nationals, working at that 
time in Libya, to leave the country within three months. This type of ad-hoc requests was reiterated 
and implemented many times afterwards.
 Moreover, he claimed that the harm done by Gaddafi and his regime to Sudan was 
more destructive than the harm from colonialism.  
30
Algeria 
 
From the beginning of the uprising, Algeria witnessed considerable movements at its border with 
Libya. According to IOM information, the composition of the migrants (in the beginning mainly 
Egyptians and Asians) changed after the first month to include more Libyans and sub-Saharan 
Africans. Out of 13,962 persons leaving Libya and crossing to Algeria, around 88 per cent were third-
country nationals and 12 per cent were Algerians (IOM, 2012: 13). Telations between Gaddafi’s Libya 
and Algeria were generally positive, despite numerous diplomatic tiffs over regional political 
                                                     
28 Washington Post, July 3, 2012- Niger resists Libyan demands for extradition of Moammar Gaddafi’s playboy son 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-03/world/35489060_1_gaddafi-loyalists-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-moammar-
gaddafi 
29 James Copnall, “Sudan armed Libyan rebels, says President Bashir”, BBC, 26 October 2011. 
30 Libya Expels Guest Workers in Migration News, October 1995, Volume 2, Number 10. 
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alliances. Algeria supported Gaddafi against the rebels and, until quite late, refused to recognize the 
authority of Libya's new governing authority: Algeria’s president Abdelaziz Bouteflika watched with 
alarm as autocratic regimes fell across the region during the Arab Spring. Algeria did not give refuge 
to Gaddafi himself, while it welcomed as refugees some surviving members of the Gaddafi’s family 
including his widow, Safiya Farkash, the mother of seven of Gaddafi's eight biological children, as 
well as his daughter Aisha and his sons Muhammad and Hannibal31
Conclusions 
. The reasons it gave for this was 
humanitarian reasons. 
The displacements from Libya have illustrated both the shortcomings and opportunities of 
international, regional and sub-regional arrangements in addressing large-scale and diverse 
displacements. With regard to the international refugee regime, the 1951 Refugees Convention clearly 
falls short when it comes to situations of general violence and very diverse categories of migrants and 
(potential) refugees. As illustrated by academics and practitioners alike, most of the people fleeing 
from the conflict were not covered by the Convention, either because of difficulties in establishing a 
link between a displaced person and one of the five stated grounds of persecution, or because they 
were third-country nationals falling outside the scope of the Convention.  
Regional and sub-regional instruments appear, therefore, suitable in addressing existing gaps and 
they complement the international/global framework. With regard to the European Union, the picture 
remains, however, mixed. The EU´s response to the increased refugee flows from Libya consisted 
mainly in financial and logistical assistance to the most exposed countries (both EU Member States as 
well as those countries bordering Libya). They also enhanced border controls by joint Frontex 
operations. This reaction reveals at least three major weaknesses in the way the EU deals with people 
seeking protection. First, the existing legal framework is still incomplete and partly inefficient. There 
is currently no formula or mechanism to distribute protected persons within the EU (“burden sharing”) 
or to jointly address the resettlement of refugees from third countries. Second, it shows the lack of 
political will in making use of existing instruments (e.g. Temporary Protection) and in acting in the 
spirit of the Treaty (“Solidarity”). Last but not least, the current situation also unveils a fundamental 
paradox of the EU, while dealing with people´s movements, not least how to reconcile the aim of 
enhanced border control with safe territory and asylum procedures for asylum seekers. 
When turning to the regional organizations of which Libya has been a member, the picture is even 
more blurred. The OAU Convention has potential to adequately address conflicts such as the one in 
Libya since it contains a broader refugee definition. This is more suitable to an African context. It has 
also been ratified by a substantial majority of the African Union´s Member States. As illustrated 
above, certain regional organizations such as the OIC and the LAS have become very active in 
immediate relief and support of people fleeing the country and also display the necessary networks 
and links to local communities. On the other hand, most regional organizations in North Africa have 
not reacted in a coordinated manner. In some cases (CEN SAD, AMU and COMESA) this inability 
reflects the general weakness of the organization and a lack of common instruments to deal with 
migrants or/and refugees. While most of the member states of these organizations are legally bound to 
different international refugee conventions (1951 Geneva Convention and/or 1969 OAU Convention), 
there are no sub-regional toolkits to address together a crisis of this kind.  
The responses of neighbouring countries have shown that individual reactions to the increased 
migration and refugee flows may be explained through prior relations of a given country with the 
Gaddafi regime. Further research would be needed to assess the position of these countries in each 
regional organization and to find out whether they were opposed to acting together and preferred, 
instead, to act unilaterally.  
                                                     
31 “The Gaddafi clan: Where are they now” BBC, 20 October 2012. 
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Annex 
Table 1. Persons fleeing from Libya by nationality and destination 
 
1. Destination 2. Nationality 3. Total 
4. Egypt 
5. Egyptians 6. 143, 514 
7. TCNs 8. 86,000 
9. Total 10. 229,514 
11. Tunisia 
12. Tunisians 13. 105,865 
14. TCNs 15. 207,549 
16. Total 17. 313,414 
18. Niger 
19. Nigeriens 20. 77,818 
21. TCNs 22. 5,117 
23. Total 24. 82,935 
25. Algeria 
26. Algerians 27. 1,666 
28. TCNs 29. 12,296 
30. Total 31. 13,962 
32. Chad 
33. Chadians 34. 50,874 
35. TCNs 36. 808 
37. Total 38. 51,682 
39. Sudan 40. Total 41. 2,800 
42. Italy 43. Total 44. 25,935 
45. Malta 46. Total 47. 1,530 
48.  49.  50.  
51. Total Arrivals 
52. Total TCNs 
53. 721,772 
54. 311,770 
Source: IOM (2011b) 
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